Copyright 1987 Goldhirsh Group, Inc.
Inc.
January, 1987
SECTION: Pg. 42
LENGTH: 4565 words
HEADLINE: FOUR-STAR MANAGEMENT
BYLINE: BY JAY FINEGAN
HIGHLIGHT:
It's one of the most dramatic turnarounds of our time. And most surprising, it
happened in the U.S. Air Force.
BODY:
IN THE CLEAR SKIES OVER SOUTHERN Nevada, a major air battle is raging. Fifteen
Russian MiGs are swarming like high-tech hornets as Air Force fighters close
in at twice the speed of sound. One of the MiGs lets fly an air-to-air
missile, sending an F-15 Eagle banking into a nine-G evasion turn. Another
F-15, locking its sights on an MiG, launches a Sidewinder missile and blows
the enemy out of the air. Moments later, a handful of A-10 Thunderbolts,
cruising in at low altitude, open fire on a column of Soviet tanks as four
F-16 Falcons suddenly appear from behind a mountain to bomb a Soviet troop
formation.
The Russian troops are only simulated, of course, as are the missiles, bombs,
and bullets. The planes, however, are real. At nearby Nellis Air Force Base,
several controllers in a darkened room are watching the battle unfold on huge
screens, the world's biggest and most expensive video game. It is something
straight out of James Bond -- and, as we'll see, straight out of Tom Peters as
well.
This is one of the Air Force's Red Flag training exercises, a mock war that
rages year-round over several million acres of Nevada desert. On one side are
the men and planes of the Tactical Air Command (TAC), which is charged with
defending American interests in the skies anywhere in the world. On the other,
squadrons of F-5 Tigers sporting Warsaw Pact paint jobs, flown by American
pilots who have been specially trained in Soviet air tactics.
On this day, the good guys win. But it wasn't always that way. A decade ago,
when Red Flag was just beginning, the Tactical Air Command was in a sorry
state. At any one time, half of the planes in its $25-billion fleet were not
battle ready and more than 220 airplanes were classified as "hangar queens" --
grounded at least three weeks for lack of spare parts or maintenance. Because
of equipment problems, TAC pilots -- trained at a cost of $1 million each --
lacked the flying time necessary to keep their skills sharp, and the best of
them were deserting the Air Force in droves. So, too, were mechanics and
technicians, frustrated in their jobs and disappointed by the deplorable
living conditions at almost every TAC installation. Perhaps worst of all was
the soaring accident rate that resulted in tragic deaths, unnecessary loss of
expensive airplanes, and embarrassment for the service.
Into this mess in 1978 stepped General W. L. (Bill) Creech. As the new
commander sized up his domain from TAC headquarters at Langley Air Force Base,
in Virginia, it looked to him like a potential national security disaster.
"The U.S. military was coming apart," is how he remembers it. "It was worse
than you think."
This is the remarkable story of how, in six and a half years, Creech turned
his command into one of the bright stars of the defense firmament. TAC
fighters today are in superb condition, its pilots fully trained, its
installations sparking. The number of hangar queens has declined from 200 to
just a handful. Reenlistment rates are way up. And a dramatic reduction in the
crash rate has saved dozens of lives and billions of dollars' worth of
airplanes.
Perhaps most remarkable, Creech was able to work his magic with no more money,
no more planes, and no more personnel than were available when he started.
Creech's strategy was to force a bottoms-up management style on an
organization that had always been strictly top-down -- pushing responsibility
and authority down into the tiniest crevices of his command. And so stunning
was his execution that the Pentagon has now begun to apply his techniques
throughout the U.S. military. Says one Defense Department official, "It's
probably our biggest success since MacArthur's Inchon landing."
Any chief executive officer would have been daunted by the challenge of simply
running so sprawling an operation, let alone reviving it. At the time that
Creech settled into his post, he was in charge of 115,000 full-time employees
working at 150 installations around the world -- plus another 65,000 men and
women trained and on call. The assets under his control were valued at more
than $40 billion, including some 3,800 aircraft -- more than twice as many as
all U.S. airlines combined. He had a discretionary budget of $1.4 billion,
with billions more reserved for fuel and spare parts.
Creech was no stranger to TAC. By 1978, he had already spent nearly 30 years
in the Air Force, a career that took in the first jet-age dogfights of the
Korean war, a military position with the United Nations, and wing commands in
Europe. But perhaps most crucial to his views on managing TAC was a stint he
had put in at the Pentagon during the days of Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara.
The watchword of the McNamara regime was centralization, for which there was a
dual imperative. Politically, the Kennedy Administration came into office as
suspicious of the military as the military was of the new President and his
advisers. McNamara's assignment was to curb interservice rivalry and bring all
of the services under greater civilian control. In addition, as the former
president of Ford Motor Co., McNamara was a disciple of the management gurus
of the day who preached that centralization was synonymous with efficiency.
While his whiz kids fashioned new military strategies for the various
services, battalions of cost analysts and systems planners cranked out new
rules and regulations that reached into every facet of military life.
Commanders in the field sensed that they had been stripped of much of their
autonomy. Decision making was jealously guarded within the Pentagon.
"The thrust was on saving money and people," Creech says. "It overlooked the
requirement to do a good job. A lot of these guys, when you started talking
about spirit and teamwork and cooperation, their eyes glazed over. They just
couldn't relate to that."
By the time Creech put on his fourth star and took command of TAC, Robert
McNamara was long gone from Defense, but his dogma of centralized management
and command had become inviolate within the Pentagon. Only it wasn't working
-- not at TAC, anyway. Granted, some duplication had been eliminated, along
with some jobs. But the cost had been high: the American military command had
been robbed of much of its vigor. Innovation and initiative were discouraged,
and people were dehumanized, thought of as mere costs of production, like so
many bullets or mess kits.
It was not that Creech was unwilling to use quantitative means by which to
judge TAC's performance. On the contrary, taking stock of the crucial
measurement of production -- the number of training sorties flown -- Creech
found that TAC had been losing ground at the rate of 8% each year since 1969.
And to deal with the problem, he proposed nothing less than a radical
restructuring of his command, one that would send authority down the ranks
along with responsibility for meeting clear and simple goals.
Pentagon planners were appalled at the thought. Creech, they argued, would
wind up adding thousands of new jobs and spending millions of new dollars.
They were uneasy with the notion that one command might be different from all
the others. And although they didn't quite come out and say it, they were
suspicious that authority could be intelligently exercised by the likes of
career military men.
"They were legion, the people against me," recalls Creech. "You couldn't
single anyone out. The villain wasn't any particular person, but the whole
system. It was all the staffers down below -- these faceless regulation
writers and approvers. I was going against the grain of the Pentagon culture.
The system bristled."
Creech had an early ally, however, in Air Force Chief of Staff General David
C. Jones. Jones's support would not assure success for the decentralization
campaign, but it did give Creech the kind of bureaucratic altitude he needed
to escape the flak from the doubters within the Pentagon.
A $27-million F-15 is a beautiful piece of design and engineering, but without
spare parts and skilled mechanics, it soon becomes a relatively useless hunk
of metal.
In 1978, when Creech took command, the procedures for getting a fighter fixed
might just as well have been devised by a British labor-union steward.
Consider the case of a jet grounded for a minor electrical malfunction.
The first man on the scene would be a general aircraft mechanic, known as a
crew chief. The chief, after making his initial inspection, would put a call
into Job Control, the centralized maintenance unit for each base. Job Control,
in turn, would call the electrical shop, which would dispatch a man out to the
flight line to work on the problem. On arriving, however, the electrician
might well discover that an entire panel would have to be removed before he
could really get to the problem, requiring yet another technician. There would
be another round of calls to Job Control and the electrical shop. Then --
perhaps after a stop at the post office and the coffee shop -- the
panel-remover would finally arrive on the flight line, only to find that he
needed a spare part. So somebody would put in a call to the base's central
supply depot, which stocked everything from jet engines to toilet paper, to
see if one was available. Three more hours might pass before the part was
trucked out by somebody else from the warehouse to the flight line. Meanwhile,
the jet and its pilot probably would have missed their scheduled sortie.
Time, however, was only half the problem. Quality was the other half. The
electrical shop, like the other specialized units for hydraulics, ejection
seats, radar, navigation systems, and the like would invariably dispatch its
lowest-ranking people for routine calls. That left the senior sergeants, with
their 15 to 25 years of experience, back at their comfortable offices, pushing
paper or maybe just reading the paper. And without their direct supervision,
much of the work done on the flight line was not the quick-fix variety -- or
worse.
"We were all aware that a human being was strapping into that jet, but there
was a lot of sloppy work done to get it into the air," says Technical Sergeant
Ruben Saldana, an F-15 crew chief at Langley and a TAC man before, during, and
after the Creech command. "And if it missed its sortie, it was no big deal."
The pilots, too, were less than enthralled. "Used to be you could take an
airplane off, but your radar wasn't working or the inertial navigation system
didn't work." says Lieutenant Colonel Burr Crittenden, an F-16 squadron
commander at Nellis. "So even when we did fly, the sorties were often low
quality."
It all added up to a lackluster fighter force, beset with apathy, sagging
morale, and horrifying statistics. Only 20% of "broken" planes were getting
repaired in a typical eight-hour shift. Pilots who needed a minimum of 15
hours of flying time a month were getting 10 or less. The average plane, which
had flown 23 sorties a month in 1969, was flying only 11 by 1978. And for
every 100,000 hours flown, seven planes were crashing. Investigators blamed
many of the crashes on faulty maintenance.
"One reason we were doing so poorly is because we were so good at
centralization," says Creech. "It was a highly matrixed system, where the
functional specialists only loosely worked for the person in charge of getting
the job done. The supervisor was just a voice on the radio. Nobody really
cared."
Creech's first move was to structure his command around a smaller and more
manageable unit of organization -- the squadron, which consists of 24 planes,
rather than the wing, which is three times the size. Starting on a trial basis
at a few installations, he created squadron repair teams, drawing technicians
from each of the maintenance disciplines. The team would work only on their
own squadron's aircraft. And instead of operating out of rear-area dispatching
locations, Creech ordered them to move right down to the flight lines.
Almost immediately, there was an under-current of opposition from some of the
senior sergeants, the princes of the maintenance realm, who had to abandon
their cushy offices and move with their men to the flight lines. Worse still,
the sergeant who once had supervised 60 electricians was now supervising 20.
Many felt demoted or diminished.
"We didn't care for it," says one of these so-called supersergeants, who asked
not to be named. "Here was this crazy general coming in and splintering an
operation we'd spent years putting together."
Creech had anticipated some hostility, but in this instance a military culture
worked in his favor: in the Air Force, there are severe penalties for
insubordination. "I'm not saying everyone thought this change was great," he
says. "But slowly they were won over. In the centralized system, we were
top-heavy in management. We were keeping beautiful track of what we were not
doing. But in our system, sergeants were sergeants. They were in charge of
people, not paper. And they had to make those people produce.If they didn't,
they were out."
The idea was to give each operational squadron and its companion maintenance
team a common identity, purpose, and spirit. The maintenance people, who had
been faceless cogs in a 2,000-person wing operation, found themselves sporting
the prestigious flight squadron patches on their fatigues. They now belonged
to the Buccaneers or the Black Falcons. They began wearing squadron baseball
caps.
With the crew chiefs, the general practitioners of the maintenance staffs,
this sense of identity was further reinforced. Where before they had worked on
any jet in the wing, now they were assigned airplanes of their very own. They
painted their names on the sides, just as pilots did. And all of a sudden, a
23-year-old buck sergeant making $15,000 a year was in charge -- yes, in
charge -- of a $27-million jet.
"It was exactly what we needed," remembers Sergeant Tony M. Brunner, a young
F-15 crew chief at Nellis. "It makes you feel important to be in charge of
something. There's got to be more to what we do here than a paycheck."
The crew chiefs took to their new responsibilities with a passion, doing
whatever was necessary to make their jets the best. They went everywhere with
them -- on deployments, through inspections, to the wash racks. And they kept
a sharp eye on the technicians -- in military parlance, "kicking ass and
taking names." Excellence became an obsession. When Creech went to visit some
crew chiefs to find out how they liked the new arrangement, a sergeant summed
it up nicely. "General," he said, "when was the last time you washed a rental
car?"
The pilots couldn't help but notice the change in attitude. "Crew chiefs now
come in sometimes on days off to buff up the planes," says Lieutenant Colonel
Paul V. Hester, a former F-15 squadron commander at Langley. "When we get back
from a sortie, they are standing at attention, saluting, holding the forms.
That's not anything they're directed to do. That's pride in their airplanes.
They want us to feel that pride when we fly."
It was not long before a strong comradery grew up between pilots and their
crew chiefs. They talked electronics, they talked football, and they went
drinking together after work. At the same time, squadrons began to build
strong identities. Squadron colors were painted once again on the tail wings
of aircraft, a time-honored tradition that had been outlawed under
centralization. And pretty soon one squadron was working overtime to beat the
other two squadrons in a wing, on everything from pilot performance to quality
of maintenance.
What Creech did best, perhaps, was to remind even the lowest-level employees
that their jobs were directly tied into TAC's central mission: flying and
fighting. Wing commanders were ordered to resume active flying, and to
emphasize the point, they were encouraged to wear flight suits when visiting
Langley. For their part, squadron maintenance officers were routinely summoned
to headquarters for three days of classroom work and inspiration from the top
brass.
"We didn't send captains in to brief them," recalls General Jerry Rogers,
Creech's logistics chief. "We did it ourselves. And on the third day, General
Creech himself came in and spent half a day with them. They had to figure that
if he does that, then he thinks maintaining airplanes is pretty important."
TAC's new spirit was soon reflected in the statistics. In Creech's first year
as TAC's commander, the sortie rate shot up 11%, and another 11% in the second
year. By 1980, the average fighter was in the air 24 hours a month, up from 17
in 1978. Some 60% of the planes were now rated mission capable, up from half.
Creech, however, was just beginning to decentralize his command and improve
the sortie rate. Moving beyond maintenance, there was also the question of the
sorties themselves -- how they were planned and scheduled. In the past, a
handful of officers at wing headquarters had plotted schedules out in detail,
squadron by squadron, a year at a time -- 16,000 sorties. Each squadron was
given not only its quota, but also detailed instructions on how and when the
sorties should be run.
In Creech's decentralized TAC, squadron commanders were given a sortie goal
and set free to design their own flying schedules. And they were given some
added incentive to meet their targets: if a squadron met its monthly goal
early, Creech decreed, then the entire squadron, from pilots to maintenance
techs, could take an extra three-day weekend.
Mind you, meeting these goals wasn't easy. These were highly sophisticated
jets with hundreds of components that often require repair or replacement. And
the training hops were no snaps for fliers, either. An F-16 pilot, for
instance, had to master precision bombing, air-to-air combat with complicated
missiles systems, and the delicate maneuvers required for tactical nuclear
strikes, should they ever be required. Still, the incentive plan worked
splendidly. Virtually every squadron in TAC now averages 10 extra three-day
weekends a year.
By the early 1980s, the TAC turn-around was attracting plenty of attention at
the Pentagon. "There were people who would say, 'You're fudging the numbers.
It looks too good,'" General Rogers recalls. The pattern was repeated many
times: they'd try something and gather enough evidence that it worked. Then,
to make it official policy, they'd have to write a regulation and send it to
the Pentagon for approval. "That was a vehicle for endless bickering about
details," Creech recalls. "There was a good bit of hostility and
foot-dragging." But with the help of the successive Air Force Chiefs of Staff,
Creech most often prevailed. And, slowly, the converts to decentralization
grew in number.
Creech and Rogers weren't shy about inviting Pentagon officials to see their
new program in action. At one important outing in 1980, for instance, they
took members of the Pentagon's vaunted Program Analysis and Evaluation Office
(PA&E) -- prime proponents of centralization -- along on the first training
deployment of F-15s to Europe. Eighteen fighters screamed into Bremgarten, a
Luftwaffe base in southwest Germany, and four hours later all of them were
loaded for combat. The next day, those same jets flew 75 sorties, nearly 4
apiece.
"Under the old system, we couldn't have dreamed of that kind of launch rate,"
says Rogers. "The PA&E folks had been very suspicious of our statistics, but
that made believers of them. They went back and became evangelists for us in
budget battles and such. It was really a watershed."
By this time, of course, centralization was under attack everywhere, as newer
management theories began to emphasize motivation, competition, delegation,
and employee ownership -- all concepts Creech had used. And as stories began
to surface about $600 toilet seats and $200 wrenches -- the stuff of
centralized procurement -- the Pentagon searched to demonstrate that it was
changing with the times. Creech's decentralization efforts became part of the
official program. And the general found there was plenty more decentralizing
to do.
He started with spare parts. An F-15 crew chief who needed a new tire for his
jet, as an example, at that time had to phone in his request to the base
warehouse and wait hours for delivery. Moving a part through the system
required 243 entries on 13 forms, involving 22 people and 16 man-hours for
administration and record keeping. It was cumbersome, frustrating, and worst
of all, slow.
"We had lost focus on why we existed -- to support aircraft and the
maintenance guys," says Colonel Donald W. Hamilton, TAC's director of supply
at Langley. "We'd grown too bureaucratic."
In 1981, Creech decided to break up the warehouse system and move aircraft
parts from the storage areas at the rear of the base right up to flight line.
Not that there was always a convenient place for parts stores big enough to
stock 10,000 different items. But with scraps of wood and leftover cans of
paint and underutilized shelving, folks made do.
What serious money Creech had, he spent for minicomputers that let crew chiefs
and their technicians know exactly what parts were available, and let supply
specialists know what parts needed to be reordered. Now, all a crew chief had
to do was climb off a jet and walk a few yards to a terminal to find out if a
part was available. A push of a button ordered the part to be set aside. Then
it was only a short walk down to the parts store with a simplified order form
to have the part in hand. More often than not, it was waiting on the counter
by the time he arrived. Total time lapsed: about 15 minutes. Today it's down
to 8.
At the same time, Creech mounted a crusade he considered equally critical to
the rebuilding of TAC. On the theory that quality begets quality, he ordered a
top-to-bottom sprucing up of every TAC facility, ranging from airplane hangars
to barracks to mess halls. Once the Reagan defense dollars began to flow, that
crusade took on a momentum of its own. But long before, Creech had begun by
ordering that nearly everything within his domain receive a fresh coat of
paint, from airplanes to cars to buildings. Nothing was spared. TAC even went
so far as to paint the backs of stop signs.
"I could paint all of TAC for the price of one F-15," he says. "My philosophy
is that if equipment is shabby looking, it affects your pride in your
organization and your performance. You can't preach to a young man that an
airplane can be shabby on the outside but has to be spic-and-span on the
inside. You either have a climate of professionalism, or one of deterioration
and decay. You can't segment it. Only on TV do you have these Black Sheep
squadrons. Good outfits look sharp and act sharp. The great pilots -- the
Chuck Yeagers -- are not sloppy people."
Fresh paint gave way to murals and lounges and comfortable furniture in
flight-line facilities, and then to new barrack complexes with carpeted rooms
and semiprivate baths. And while pilots had formation flybys to show their
stuff to the public and the brass, squadron vehicle fleets held annual
"roll-bys" displaying their gleaming trucks and vans.
It was all part of General Creech's emphasis on respect and recognition for
his people. "Pride is the fuel of human accomplishment," he preached to his
command. And competition was the spark plug. To drive home the point, annual
awards banquets, complete with citations and trophies, were held at every
wing, to recognize the year's best maintenance and supply specialists.
By the time General Creech left TAC, 85% of his airplanes were rated as
mission capable, and jets were averaging 21 sorties a month, with 29 hours in
the air. In wartime, TAC was capable of launching 6,000 sorties a day, double
what it had been when he arrived at Langley. In peacetime, the crash rate had
dropped from one for every 13,000 flying hours to one for every 50,000 -- and
crashes traced to faulty maintenance nearly vanished.
TAC, under Creech, had gone from the Air Force's worst command to its best.
For much of the time, it had been a battle, and heads had rolled. The lazy and
the incompetent, who had found numerous hiding places in a centralized
structure, were smoked out when maintenance operations moved to the flight
line and squadrons were held accountable for their performance. Some had to
leave. But many more decided to stay. In 1983, two-thirds of the first-term
mechanics decided to reenlist, or nearly double the rate of 1977, the year
before Creech took command. Second-termer retention rates went from 68% to 85%
over the same period. And some of the older technicians found they liked
Creech's program so much that they recalled retirement papers to see it
through.
TAC commanding officers thrived under the new system. Of the 148 wing
commanders who served under Creech, only about 3% were relieved for poor
performance -- fewer than under any of Creech's three predecessors. "It was
not a ruthless system," Creech emphasizes. "You just don't get results by
going around chopping people's heads off."
Even in retirement, Creech's philosophy sets the tone for Air Force
management. General Larry D. Welch, now the Air Force Chief of Staff, served
in staff positions under Creech. He later went on to head up the Strategic Air
Command, the nation's nuclear strike force, where decentralization also became
a battle cry.
Even the Pentagon has got the religion. A recent Pentagon directive gives
commanders new authority to abolish regulations, streamline procedures, and do
whatever they think best to enhance mission accomplishment. "People doing the
job day in and day out know better how to do it than some guy who is sitting
behind a desk," asserts William H. Taft IV, deputy secretary of defense.
As for Creech, now 59, he continues to spread the gospel to leaders of
industry and government as a lecturer, consultant, and corporate board member.
In his travels, Creech remarks how common it is for executives to think of
decentralization and delegation as loss of control and abdication of command.
If anything, he says, just the opposite is true: "When I left TAC, I had more
control over it than my predecessors. I'd created leaders and helpers at all
those various levels. Without that kind of network below you, you're a leader
in name only.
"It's not really that hard to run a large organization," the general explains.
"You just have to think small about how to achieve your goals. There's a very
finite limit to how much leadership you can exercise at the very top. You
can't micromanage -- people resent that. Things are achieved by individuals,
by collections of twos and fives and twenties, not collections of 115,000. And
that's as true in industry as it is in the military."
FOUR-STAR MANAGEMENT
* Workers are more professional when provided with a professional environment.
* Workers take more responsibility when they have a sense of ownership.
* Management control is established through motivation, not regulation.
* Consolidation and centralization can lower output as well as costs.
GRAPHIC: Picture 1, General Bill Creech, retired commander of the Air
Force's Tactical Air Command, His may be the most important U.S. military
victory since MacArthur's Inchon landing., BO PARKER; Picture 2, F-15 fighter
pilot prepares to take off from Nellis, He cost $1 million to train and $27
million to equip., BO PARKER; Picture 3, Commander Crittenden and his
squadron's once-banned decals, Fostering teamwork, competition, and a sense of
ownership, BO PARKER; Picture 4, Preflight planning at Nellis, Pushing
authority down to the lowest levels, BO PARKER; Picture 5, Flight-line parts
depot, Orders that used to take hours to fill now take minutes., BO PARKER